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Abstract
Sex workers receive a price premium for unprotected sex. Research has inferred
that the source of this premium is a compensating differential for STI risk. I intro-
duce a compensating differential for pregnancy risk as a novel source of this price
premium through a simple model that predicts the price for unprotected sex in-
creasing with the probability of pregnancy through decreased unprotected sex. I
empirically test this using a rich panel dataset of 19,041 sexual transactions by 192
sex workers in Busia, Kenya collected during 2005 and 2006. I use the probability
of pregnancy as an instrument for unprotected sex and run two-stage least-squares
(2SLS) regression and find that a compensating differential for pregnancy risk is
a source of the price premium for unprotected sex. The price premium for preg-
nancy risk is as high as USD 122 or about 16 times average price. I also test for a
compensating differential for STI risk and clients’ disutility for condoms, the other
competing theories, and find that a compensating differential for STI risk is also a
source of the price premium for unprotected sex, however, I do not find evidence
for clients’ disutility for condoms as a source of the price premium for unprotected
sex. Identifying and estimating sources of the price premium for unprotected sex
will allow policymakers to implement interventions that will reduce both the supply
and the demand for unprotected sex.
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1 Introduction
Sex workers receive a price premium each time they have unprotected sex. Dupas and
Robinson (2012) as well as Robinson and Yeh (2011) have shown that, during health,
political, or economic shocks, many women have riskier sex in order to capture income
gains from this price premium for unprotected sex. This can potentially contribute to
an increase in the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Identifying the source of this price premium is
thus very important, particularly because sex workers have HIV prevalence rates that are
higher than other groups in the population and are thus significant drivers of HIV/AIDS
epidemics across many countries (UNAIDS 2010). Globally, sex workers experience
higher rates of HIV infection than in most other population groups (UNAIDS 2009).1
Identifying ways to mitigate incentives to have unprotected sex are especially important
in contexts with high prevalence of HIV such as sub Saharan Africa, which has roughly
five times the global average prevalence rate of HIV (UNAIDS 2012). Unprotected sex
increases STI transmission and, as Oster (2005) shows, non-HIV/AIDS STI transmission
can be the key factor in HIV/AIDS transmission, making STIs quite costly.
The price premium for unprotected sex is universally observed across different con-
texts. It has been documented in India (Rao et al. 2003), in Mexico (Gertler et al.
2005), in Kenya (Robinson and Yeh 2011), in Congo (Ntumbanzondo et al. 2006), in
Chicago (Levitt and Venkatesh 2007) and, most recently, in Ecuador (Arunachalam and
Shah 2013). Throughout this literature, however, with the exception of Arunachalam
and Shah (2013), researchers have assumed that this premium reflects a compensating
differential for STI risk. This inference is made because the price for unprotected sex
increases with STI prevalence. Specifically, Arunachalam and Shah (2013) find that a
1 percentage increase in STI prevalence increases the price premium by 33 percentage
points. They also find that the anal sex premium is larger than the vaginal sex premium,
1See Figure in the Appendix that uses data from UNAIDS (2010) showing a linear relationship
between HIV prevalence among sex workers and the general population.
2
as do Robinson and Yeh (2011).
Arunachalam and Shah (2013) find a positive relationship between STI prevalence
and the price premium for unprotected sex. However, they also find a price premium in
places with zero STI prevalence. I build from this result and, in this paper, I introduce a
novel source of the price premium that has gone unexplored in the literature. I argue that
an alternative source of the price premium is a compensating differential for pregnancy
risk. I chart this course because the literature has so far ignored the fact that condoms
prevent both STIs and pregnancy. Therefore, looking at the differential prices clients
pay for unprotected sex may capture not only sex workers’ compensating differential
for STI risk (if any) but also pregnancy risk. Using a rich dataset from Robinson and
Yeh (2011), I test to see whether a compensating differential for pregnancy risk is an
alternative source of the price premium for unprotected sex.
I also test whether a compensating differential for STI risk and clients’ disutility for
condoms explain the price premium for unprotected sex. I test for clients’ disutility for
condoms because the literature also suggests that regardless of sex workers’ risk aversion
to STIs (or pregnancy), a price premium for unprotected sex will still be observed because
of sex workers’ ability to charge clients more because of their disutility for condom use
(Arunachalam and Shah 2013). Rao et al. (2003) argues that the price premium for
unprotected sex stems from clients’ unwillingness to use condoms. Gertler et al. (2005)
model the price premium as the result of clients’ willingness to pay for and sex workers’
willingness to accept unprotected sex, and find that attractive sex workers get about
twice the premium for unprotected sex, a measure of bargaining power. The unique
contribution of this paper to the literature is the introduction of pregnancy risk as
an alternative source of the price premium; using menstrual cycles to directly assign
probabilities of pregnancy; and, of course, the evaluation of all the competing theories
of the source of the price premium for unprotected sex.
In testing for the sources of the price premium for unprotected sex, I use innovative
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measures of STI risk, pregnancy risk, and clients’ disutility for condoms.2 To measure
STI risk, I use a dummy variable equal to one for each sexual transaction that occurred
with a risky client.3 To identify the premium associated with STI risk I interact this risky
client dummy variable with a dummy variable equal to one for each sexual transaction
that occurred without a condom. Together, the interaction of these two variables reflect
my measure of the price premium for unprotected sex due to STI risk.
To measure pregnancy risk I interact two variables. The first is a dummy variable
equal to one for each sexual transaction that occurred with a sex worker who is not on
birth control. This first variable allows me to identify, for sex workers who are not on
birth control, how much they charge for sexual transactions. The second is a variable
equal to the direct probabilities of pregnancy for each sex worker. This second variable
reflects a direct measure of each sex worker’s probability of getting pregnant during any
sexual transaction.4 To identify the premium associated with pregnancy risk I interact
these variables with a dummy variable equal to one for each sexual transaction that
occurred without a condom. Together, these variables allow me to identify, for each
unprotected sexual transaction, how much a sex worker charged a client during days
when her chances of getting pregnant were non-negligibly above zero.
To measure clients’ disutility for condoms, I use a dummy variable equal to one
whenever a sexual transaction occurred with a client who likes to have unprotected sex
more than the average client. To identify the premium associated with clients’ disutility
for condoms, I interact this variable with a dummy variable equal to one for each sexual
2Further details of all these measures are in Section 3.2.
3This variable captures sex workers’ subjective beliefs on how risky their clients were. In particular,
this dummy variable equals one whenever a sex worker thought the client was at high risk of having
HIV/AIDS. Further details can be found in Robinson and Yeh (2011).
4I use two measures of probability of pregnancy. The first is simply the direct probabilities for
pregnancy for each 28-day menstrual cycle. These direct probabilities come from Wilcox et al. (2001).
The second uses these same direct probabilities for the first four days of the menstrual cycle, but 0.165
for the remaining days of menstrual cycle. Details on how 0.165 is obtained can be found in Section
3.2. This measure captures the uncertainty of any sex worker in predicting her probabilities of getting
pregnant and thus reflects the stochastic nature of predicting one’s probability of pregnancy. Please
note that I also interact these probabilities by the number of clients to incorporate the idea that the
probability of pregnancy increases with each marginal client.
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transaction that occurred without a condom. Together, these two variables allow me to
identify for each unprotected sexual transaction, how much a client with a disutility for
condoms pays.
Using all these measures, I use the probability of pregnancy as an instrument for
unprotected sex and run two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regressions and find that a com-
pensating differential for pregnancy risk is the source of the price premium for unpro-
tected sex. The price premium for pregnancy risk is as much as USD 1225 which is
about 16 times average price. The price premium for STI risk is USD 3.3 or 38 percent
of average price, but only a thirty-seventh or 2.7 percent of the compensating differential
for pregnancy risk. Clients’ disutility for condoms has a premium as much as USD 0.154
or 1.8 percent of average price but is not statistically signficant.
Section 2 provides motivation and a simple theory as to why a compensating differ-
ential for pregnancy risk is a source of the price premium for unprotected sex. Section
3 presents the data. The remaining sections introduce the empirical specifications and
presents results (Section 4), while the penultimate section presents heterogeneity anal-
ysis, robustness checks and limitations (Section 5), and the final section concludes the
paper (Section 6).
2 Motivation and Theory
Although having unprotected sex increases sex workers’ risk of STI infection, and we
would expect to observe them reducing risky sexual behavior (Posner 1992), the price
premium for unprotected sex acts to incentivize sex workers towards risky sexual be-
havior. In an attempt to capture this premium, sex workers are incentivized to instead
increase risky sexual behavior. Sex workers also use the price premium to smooth con-
5Robinson and Yeh (2011) report that the Kenyan shilling-US dollar exchange rate during sampling
was 70 Ksh to the dollar. I use this exchange rate to calculate dollar values throughout this paper to
get a sense of these premia in US dollars.
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sumption during idiosyncratic health shocks as well as during and after political conflict
(Robinson and Yeh 2011; Dupas and Robinson 2012). Arunachalam and Shah (2013)
provide the most compelling and rigorous evaluation of the compensating differential
for STI risk as a source of the price premium for unprotected sex. They introduce a
simple theoretical framework than incorporates clients’ disutility for condoms as well as
sex workers’ risk aversion to STI transmission. In this paper, I build on Arunachalam
and Shah (2013) but, instead of a compensating differential for STI risk as the source
of the price premium for unprotected sex, I argue that a compensating differential for
pregnancy risk is an alternative source of the price premium for unprotected sex. Next,
I introduce the main theoretical framework. Before that I explain why we observe STI
prevalence increasing with the price premium for unprotected sex.
2.1 STI Risk
In order to explain why the price premium for unprotected sex increases with STI
prevalence, we must first remember that condoms prevent both STIs and pregnancy. If
we assume pregnancy risk aversion and a compensating differential for pregnancy risk as
the source of the price premium then we can easily think about a heterogeneous distri-
bution of sex workers in which some sex workers are more or less risk averse than others.
In areas with a distribution of disproportionately more risk averse sex workers, the price
premium will increase to compensate for this risk aversion. This price premium in turn
will incentivize the sex workers to have more unprotected sex and in turn the transmis-
sion of STIs will increase, causing STI prevalence to increase. Alternatively, in areas with
a distribution of disproportionately less risk averse sex workers, the price premium will
decrease because sex workers do not need to be compensated for unprotected sex. This
price premium in turn will disincentivize the sex workers to have more unprotected sex
and in turn the transmission of STIs will decrease, causing STI prevalence to decrease.
STI prevalence is not the cause of the price premium for unprotected sex but rather the
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outcome of it.
Although Arunachalam and Shah (2013) argue that a compensating differential for
STI risk is the source of the price premium for unprotected sex, they also find that the
price premium for unprotected sex is observed in places with zero STI prevalence. More-
over, observing a positive relationship between STI prevalence and the price premium
for unprotected sex captures not only increased risk to STIs but also pregnancy. Since
condoms exclude the possibility of STI infection as well as pregnancy, the inference that
unprotected sex is transacted at a relatively higher price than protected sex as compen-
sation for increased STI risk is far from robust. To resolve this issue, any empirical test
of the theory for the compensating differential for STI risk must exclude the possibility
of other costs which are also prevented through condom use and which sex workers might
potentially wish to avoid, such as pregnancy.
2.2 Pregnancy Risk
Pregnancy introduces several costs to the sex worker including (1) the direct costs of
child-rearing, which are non-negative and non-trivial6; (2) lost wages during the latter
stages of pregnancy and early stages of the child’s infancy when the mother’s time is
almost exclusively used caring for the infant and she is unable to work for wages; and (3)
if the sex worker decides to abort, costs of abortion including monetary costs and any
health complications that occur as a result of the procedure, both physiological as well
as psychic costs.7 The profit maximizing sex worker would thus engage in unprotected
6Important inputs in the rearing of children include food and housing at the most basic level and
education at a much higher order level all of which are non-trivially above zero.
7Besides these costs, an additional cost might be reduced marriage prospects. Siow (1998) and
Edlund and Korn (2002) assume that men prefer to marry women who have no children implying that
children might also potentially reduce marriage prospects. Becker (1993) argues that children are seen
as capital investment in marriage, and thus the prospect of divorce lowers the accumulation of children
and also shows that empirically, divorced women with children remarry more slowly than divorced men.
Weitzman and Dixon (1979) argue that young children raise the cost of searching for another mate and
reduce the net resources of these mothers. Although all these should push us to believe that sex work
lowers marriage prospects, sex workers in our dataset however, say that sex work has increased their
marriage prospects. Although Robinson and Yeh (2011) suggest that sex work might affect marriage
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sex if and only if the price premium for unprotected sex is greater than the marginal
cost of pregnancy.
To fix ideas, I present a simple expected utility model. Let P1 be the price received
by a sex worker for unprotected sex in the sex market or the price premium; P2 be the
price received by a sex worker for protected sex in the sex market; Q be unprotected
sexual transactions by the sex worker in the sex market; g be the probability of getting
pregnant (where 0 ≤ g ≤ 1). Let C be all the costs of pregnancy, including costs of
rearing a child from the prenatal stage to adulthood or any abortion costs. As such,
if the sex worker chooses to supply unprotected sex, her expected utility is defined as
follows;
gU(P1Q− CQ) + (1− g)U(−P2Q) (1)
Notice that the costs of pregnancy do not feature on the right of the above equation.
For simplicity I assume that there are no costs of pregnancy for sex workers who chose
to use condoms.8 I make Q negative in the protected sex part of the above equation
to reflect the fact that sex workers only receive P2 if they have sex with a condom and
have a disutility for receiving P2 when Q > 0. I also assume that all utility functions
are continuous and twice-differential functions.
The sex worker thus has the following maximization problem with respect to unpro-
tected sex, Q;
max
q gU(P1Q− CQ) + (1− g)U(−P2Q) (2)
prospects on the intensive (partner quality) rather than the extensive (finding a partner) margin, I
exclude this possible cost of marriage prospects so to not detract from the general point that pregnancy
and its products are costly to sex workers.
8Many studies have showed that condoms are highly effective at preventing pregnancy. Davis and
Weller (1999) for instance find that the likelihood of pregnancy after protected sexual intercourse is
as low as 0.026. This simplifying assumption allows me to focus on just the effects of pregnancy risk
whenever a condom is not used.
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Subject to some Q and C such that Q ≤ Q¯ and C ≤ C¯.9
The first order conditions are derived as follows;
g(P1 − C)[U ′(P1Q∗ − CQ∗)]− (1− g)P2[U ′(−P2Q∗)] = 0 (3)
This implies the sex worker choses the amount of unprotected sex that maximizes
her expected utility in the following way;
U ′(P1Q∗ − CQ∗)
U ′(−P2Q∗) =
P2
P1 − C [
1− g
g
] (4)
Further, the second order conditions are derived as follows;
g(P1 − C)2[U ′′(P1Q∗ − CQ∗)] + (1− g)(P2)2[U ′′(−P2Q∗)] (5)
Now, before I proceed to look at the sex worker’s maximization decision based on
different levels of g, let us first look at what the second order conditions allow us to infer.
Please note that because I do not ex ante impose any risk profiles in the above model,
I can explore different effects for different risk profiles.
First, if I assume the sex worker is risk averse, or her second order utility functions
are negative (U ′′ < 0), I can sign each of the terms of her second order conditions in the
following manner10:
9This basically defines some upper limit to unprotected sexual transactions and costs of pregnancy.
There are only so many sexual transactions any one sex worker can have, even in the face of limitless client
supply. On the costs of pregnancy, although one can model even mortality in the wake of supplying sex
in the market (unprotected or otherwise), what is important to note is that these costs are not without
bound.
10Note that g and (1−g) are bounded by zero and one and are thus positive; both (P1−C)2 and (P2)2
are squares of some entity and thus must also be positive; and lastly U ′′(P1Q∗ −CQ∗) and U ′′(−P2Q∗)
are negative by the assumption of risk aversion.
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g︸︷︷︸
+ve
(P1 − C)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ve
[U ′′(P1Q∗ − CQ∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
-ve
+ (1− g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ve
(P2)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ve
[U ′′(−P2Q∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
-ve︸ ︷︷ ︸
-ve
(6)
which means that the whole equation becomes negative, thus indicating that the
solution of the first order conditions will identify a maximum level of unprotected sex
that will maximize a sex worker’s utility.
Similarly, if I assume the sex worker is risk preferring, or her second order utility
functions are positive (U ′′ > 0), I can sign each of the terms of her second order conditions
in the following manner11:
g︸︷︷︸
+ve
(P1 − C)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ve
[U ′′(P1Q∗ − CQ∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ve
+ (1− g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ve
(P2)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ve
[U ′′(−P2Q∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ve︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ve
(7)
which means that the whole equation becomes positive, thus indicating that the
solution of the first order conditions will identify a minimum level of unprotected sex
that a sex worker will chose. In a distribution of sex workers in any given sex market,
there are bound to be both risk averse sex workers as well as risk preferring sex workers.
One can imagine an equilibrium where there are enough of both risk profiles among
sex workers so that the aggregate risk profiles of the entire sex worker population is
neutral. This would only be true if there existed no price premium for unprotected sex.
So, moving forward, I assume that sex workers are risk averse and that the following
analysis allows us to think about what level of unprotected sex maximizes a sex worker’s
11Once again, g and (1 − g) are bounded by zero and one and are thus positive; both (P1 − C)2
and (P2)
2 are squares of some entity and thus must also be positive; and lastly U ′′(P1Q∗ − CQ∗) and
U ′′(−P2Q∗) are positive by the assumption of risk preference.
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utility.12
Now, recall that the first order conditions derived the following equality:
U ′(P1Q∗ − CQ∗)
U ′(−P2Q∗) =
P2
P1 − C [
1− g
g
] (8)
From this I can make the following propositions, but, before I do, I assume the
following:
• Utility increases with prices or ∂U∂Pi > 0 where i is either equal to one or two.
• Utility increases with unprotected sexual transactions or ∂U∂Q > 0
• Utility decreases with costs of pregnancy or ∂U∂C < 0
• And finally, conditional on getting pregnant, costs of pregnancy are constant across
levels of unprotected sex.
2.3 Proposition and Implications
Proposition: The price for unprotected sex decreases and increases with the prob-
ability of pregnancy but only through probability of pregnancy’s effect on unprotected
sex.13
As the probability of pregnancy decreases, sex workers can easily increase their util-
ity by increasing unprotected sex, avoiding any costs associated with unprotected sex.
Any sex worker who is experiencing probabilities of pregnancy that are trivially low in
any given day would be willing to have unprotected sex for a lower price than during
days that she is experiencing non-trivially high probabilities of pregnancy. Conversely,
any sex worker who is experiencing probabilities of pregnancy that are non-trivially high
12The third risk profile—risk neutral—does not provide any meaningful predictions of a minimum or
a maximum because the second order conditions in this case are zero.
13All Proofs in Appendix C.
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in any given day would only be willing to have unprotected sex if she were compensated
for the risk of pregnancy with a relatively higher price for unprotected sex. Because
as the probability of pregnancy increases sex workers can easily increase utility through
reducing unprotected sex, the only way to reverse this and induce sex workers to have
unprotected sex is to have the price for unprotected sex increase as compensation for
pregnancy risk. The prediction of this model and its proposition is that we will empiri-
cally observe the price for unprotected sex increasing with the probability of pregnancy
through the effect the probability of pregnancy has on women’s willingness to supply
unprotected sex. As a result, holding the price for protected sex constant, the price
premium for unprotected sex will increase with the probability of pregnancy. Results of
this paper are consistent with this simple prediction, but, before I present those results,
Sections 3 and 4 introduce the data and the empirical specifications.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
3.1 Data
The dataset is from Robinson and Yeh (2011)14 and includes background information
and self-reported information by 192 sex workers reporting on 19,041 sexual transactions
in 12,536 sex worker days. A random sample of 248 women were selected to be a part
of the study from 1,205 women identified. Of these 248 women, only 192 women had
complete and usable data. Of these 56 that did not constitute the final sample, 7
refused to participate at all, and the remaining 49 either did not complete the study
or had unusable reported data. Robinson and Yeh (2011) report that these 49 attrited
women are not statistically different along most background characteristics as those who
remained in the study. Data collection occurred between October 2005 and October 2006.
A baseline survey collected background information on the women, and all women were
14More details on this dataset can be found on pages 39-43 from Robinson and Yeh (2011).
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asked to keep and record sexual transactions through provided diaries. The women were
compensated with paid cash for keeping these diaries. The women were asked to provide
detailed information about the sexual transactions with clients (up to a maximum of
three transactions per day). To avoid losing illiterate women in the sample, efforts were
made to help these women fill in the diaries, however literacy in the sample was relatively
high with 95 percent and 88 percent of sampled women being able to read and write
Kiswahili, respectively.15
3.2 Measuring Pregnancy Risk, STI Risk, and Clients’ Disutility for
Condoms
In order to measure pregnancy risk, STI risk, and clients’ disutility for condoms, I
interacted several variables from the Robinson and Yeh (2011) dataset.
3.2.1 STI Risk
To measure STI risk, I use a dummy variable equal to one for each sexual transaction
that occurred with a risky client.16 To identify the premium associated with STI risk I
interact this risky client dummy variable with a dummy variable equal to one for each
sexual transaction that occurred without a condom. Together, the interaction of these
two variables reflect the measure of the price premium for unprotected sex due to STI
risk.
3.2.2 Pregnancy Risk
To measure pregnancy risk I interact two variables. The first is a dummy variable
equal to one for each sexual transaction that occurred with a sex worker who is not on
birth control. This first variable allows me to identify, for sex workers who are not on
15See Table 7.1.
16This variable reflects sex workers’ subjective beliefs about clients’ risk of having HIV/AIDS. See
Robinson and Yeh (2011) for further details.
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birth control, how much they charge for sexual transactions. The second is a variable
equal to the direct probabilities of pregnancy for each sex worker. This second variable
reflects a direct measure of each sex worker’s probability of getting pregnant during any
sexual transaction. I use estimated probabilities of pregnancy from Wilcox et al. (2001)
and Wilcox et al. (1995). Wilcox et al. (2001) calculate estimated mean probabilities
of clinical pregnancy for each day of a woman’s menstrual cycle17 while Wilcox et al.
(1995, p. 1519) provide probabilities of pregnancy for a woman who has unprotected
sexual intercourse everyday (0.37), every other day (0.33), and once per week (0.15).
Before assigning probabilities of pregnancy, however, I first must have information on
the exact day a sex worker is in her menstrual cycle. To map menstrual days to each sex
worker’s sexual transactions on any given day, I use two variables from the Robinson and
Yeh (2011) dataset. The first is a dummy variable equal to one whenever a sex worker
reports having menstruated the day of the sexual transaction. The second is a dummy
variable equal to one whenever a sex worker reports having menstruated the day before
the sexual transaction. Using these two variables I code the first day of a sex worker’s
menstrual cycle whenever the sex worker having menstruated the day of but not the
day before the sexual transaction. I then loop 28-day menstrual cycles across all sex
workers and sexual transactions.18 After mapping menstrual cycles I then assign direct
probabilities of pregnancy to each menstrual day using the Wilcox et al. (2001) day-
specific probabilities of clinical pregnancy. A second probability of pregnancy measure
incorporates sex workers’ uncertainty of their menstrual cycle. In this second measure,
I assign direct probabilities of pregnancy using the Wilcox et al. (2001) day-specific
probabilities of clinical pregnancy only for the days during a sex worker’s menses (days
one to four). The remaining days I interact two variables. The first is the probability of
pregnancy (0.33)19 following unprotected sexual intercourse every other day reported in
17Table 1 on page 213 of Wilcox et al. (2001) presents these estimates.
18Other economists have also used 28-day cycles when using women’s menstrual cycles, such as Ichino
and Moretti (2009) who use women’s menstrual cycles as an instrument for employment days.
19I use this probability because about 81 percent of sex workers in the sample had sexual intercourse
14
Wilcox et al. (1995). The second is the natural probability of a sex worker being in her
fertile period. This is calculated by observing that her fertile period lasts 12 days20 and
given that we have mapped her first 4 days, her remaining unmapped days total 24. So
12/24 (or 0.5) is her natural probability of being on a day within her fertile period. So,
multiplying 0.5 and 0.33, I get 0.165, which I assign to menstrual days after the 5th day
across all sex workers.
For any missing values I assign the probability of pregnancy of 0.165 for reasons
described above. I also interact both probability of pregnancy measures with the number
of clients that the sex worker transacted sex with. I do this because for each sex worker,
having multiple sexual partners will increase their probabilities of pregnancy for that day
because the potency of sperm would only have decreased if sexual intercourse occurred
with the same client during that particular day (MacLeod and Gold 1953; Freund 1962;
Poland et al. 1985).
To identify the premium associated with pregnancy risk I interact both probability
of pregnancy measures with a dummy variable equal to one for each sexual transaction
that occurred without a condom. Together, these variables allow me to identify, for each
unprotected sexual transaction, how much a sex worker charged a client during days
when her chances of getting pregnant were non-negligibly above zero.
each day and so this is a lower bound estimate of the chances of these women getting pregnant given
their relatively high sexual activities. More importantly, although frequent sexual intercourse affects the
potency of sperm (MacLeod and Gold 1953; Freund 1962; Poland et al. 1985), these sexual transactions
did not necessarily occur with the same clients. In fact, only 17 percent of transactions, on average,
in the dataset occurred with regular clients, while on the other hand, over 64 percent of transactions,
on average, occurred with casual clients. It is also important to note that Dunson et al. (1999), in
re-evaluating Wilcox et al. (1995)’s estimates, revises those estimates to as high as 0.42. Both these
points are important to keep in mind because the probability of pregnancy I use here for these women
(sex workers) constitutes a conservative estimate of their actual probabilities of pregnancy.
20A woman’s fertile period is from days 8 to 19 of her menstrual cycle (Beads 2013). Please also note
that this fertile window period incorporates a woman’s ovulation cycle and sperm life within a woman’s
body and that around 80 percent of women fall within this fertile window because they typically have
26-32 day menstrual cycles (University 2013).
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3.2.3 Clients’ Disutility for Condoms
Finally, to measure clients’ disutility for condoms, I use a dummy variable equal to
one whenever a sexual transaction occurred with a client who likes to have unprotected
sex more than the average client. To identify the premium associated with clients’
disutility for condoms, I interact this variable with a dummy variable equal to one for
each sexual transaction that occurred without a condom. Together, these two variables
allow me to identify for each unprotected sexual transaction, how much a client with a
disutility for condoms pays..
3.3 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are presented in Tables 7.1-7.3. The average sex worker in the
sample is 28 years old, started sex work when she was around 19 years old, has 2 children,
and has completed over nine grade years of education.21 Forty-four percent of sex workers
in the sample have never been married, while twenty-three and twenty percent of sex
workers in the sample have been widowed or divorced, respectively. Ninety percent of
the sampled women come from the Luo and Luhya tribes.
Table 7.1 here.
The women in the sample are well informed about the risks related to HIV/AIDS,
as demonstrated by the fact that the average woman in the sample scored 94 out of 100
on a test of HIV knowledge. The test evaluated knowledge on HIV transmission, risk
reduction methods, and misconceptions surrounding HIV/AIDS. Women in the sample
earn more money from sex work than from other activities. The average woman in the
sample earns 851 Ksh (USD 12) a day from over 7 hours of sex work, for an hourly wage
rate of about 152 Ksh (USD 2). Alternatively, the average woman earns just 106 Ksh
21The education level of the sex workers in the sample is similar to that of the average Kenyan woman
(Robinson and Yeh 2011).
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(USD 1.5) per day from other work over an 8 hour day, for a daily wage rate of about
41 Ksh (USD 0.6). Sex workers in this sample are similar to other sex worker samples
from other studies in this regard because the average sex worker typically earns more
than a similar woman with similar demographics in the general population (Edlund and
Korn 2002; Gertler et al. 2005; Arunachalam and Shah 2013).
Table 7.2 here.
The data also provides very detailed information on all the 3,656 clients. Nine per-
cent of clients are considered poor22 and about twenty-seven percent are government
employees. Nineteen percent work as truck drivers and another nineteen percent busi-
nessmen. Forty-nine percent are from the Luhya and Luo tribes. Fourteen percent are
from the Kikuyu tribe, while six percent and four percent are Somalis and Ugandans,
respectively. Sixty-two percent and fifty-four percent of clients are considered clean and
handsome, respectively. A quarter of clients are uncircumcised, and forty-six percent are
considered at high risk of HIV/AIDS. Forty-five percent of clients have some disutility
for condoms.
Eight percent of sex workers reported having vaginal sex without a condom. Three
percent of sex workers report having some STI and an equal percentage report having
unprotected vaginal sex with a client at high risk of HIV/AIDS. Sixty percent of sex
workers are on birth control. The average woman received 510 Ksh (USD 7.3) for each
sexual transaction. Figure 3.3 shows that the average price for each unprotected vaginal
sexual transaction is 604 Ksh (USD 8.6), while each vaginal sexual transaction with
a condom is 550 Ksh (USD 7.9), providing suggestive evidence that there is a price
premium for unprotected sex consistent with the literature.
Table 7.3 here.
22Details on what constitutes poor can be found in Robinson and Yeh (2011).
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Figure 1: Price Premium for Unprotected Sex.
4 Empirical Specifications and Results
4.1 Specification
To test whether a compensating differential for pregnancy risk is the source of the
price premium for unprotected sex I use the probability of pregnancy as an instrument
for unprotected sex, as the theoretical model predicts, and estimate a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regression. The first stage specification is presented below in equation
(1) for the rth transaction for the ith sex worker at the tth date that includes sex
worker controls, γsirt and client controls, ωirt.
23 The time fixed effect τt
24 will pick up
time-varying effects on prices, such as day-specific demand changes. Finally, irt is an
23Sex worker-controls include sex workers’ age, experience, years of education, literacy, tribe, marital
status, and number of own children. I also control for whether clients are regular, risky, clean, wealthy,
handsome, occupation, ethnicity and for their disutility for condoms.
24The time fixed effects are simply day and month dummies.
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idiosyncratic error term. In all specifications standard errors are clustered at the sex
worker level.25
The first stage regresses unprotected sex on the probability of pregnancy as follows;
NCirt = β0 + β1PP +
S∑
s=1
βsγsirt +
C∑
c=1
βcωcirt + τt + irt (1)
where NC or No Condom is a dummy variable equal to one when a condom is
not used during vaginal sex and PP or Probability of Pregnancy is the direct measure
of clinical pregnancy for each sexual transaction26. Because the theoretical framework
predicts that the price premium will increase with the probability of pregnancy (∂P1∂g > 0)
but only through reduced unprotected sex (∂Q∂g < 0) we should expect β1 < 0.
The second stage regresses price on the instrumented NC with sex worker and client
controls, as well as the time fixed effects as follows:
Pirt =β0 + β1N̂C + β2NB + β3(NC ×NB) + β4(NC × PP ) + β5(PP ×NB)+
β6(NC × PP ×NB) +
S∑
s=1
βsγsirt +
C∑
c=1
βcωcirt + τt + irt
(2)
where NB or No Birth Control is a dummy variable equal to one for a sex worker who
is not on birth control; NC × NB is the interaction between No Condom and No Birth
Control ; NC × PP is the interaction between No Condom and Probability of Pregnancy ;
PP × NB is the interaction between the Probability of Pregnancy and No Birth Control ;
and of course NC × PP × NB is the interaction between No Condom, the Probability
of Pregnancy, and No Birth Control. Once again, because the theoretical framework
25Running all the models by clustering standard errors at the sex worker level, to account for the fact
that errors are likely correlated for a particular sex worker is consistent with Robinson and Yeh (2011),
while Arunachalam and Shah (2013) cluster at the sex worker city location level.
26Recall that I use two measures of pregnancy risk. For further details see Section 3.2.2.
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predicts that the price premium will increase with the probability of pregnancy (∂P1∂g > 0)
but only through reduced unprotected sex (∂Q∂g < 0) we should expect β6 > 0.
The identifying assumption is that the probability of pregnancy exogenously predicts
whether a sex worker decides to have unprotected sex and that it is uncorrelated with
anything else in the structural equation’s error term, irt. If these assumptions hold
and a relationship between pregnancy risk and the price premium for unprotected sex
is identified, then β6 will reflect a compensating differential for pregnancy risk as the
source of the price premium for unprotected sex in specification (1).
In a final specification, I test pregnancy risk against the other competing sources
of the price premium for unprotected sex. I estimate the same 2SLS specification but
include variables that estimate a compensating differential for STI risk and clients’ disu-
tility for condoms. I do not present the first stage results because they remain the same
for this specification. Specifically, I estimate the following second stage model:
Pirt =β0 + β1N̂C + β2NB + β3(NC ×NB) + β4(NC × PP ) + β5(PP ×NB)+
β6(NC × PP ×NB) + β7RL+ β8(RL×NC) + β9DC + β10(DC ×NC)+
S∑
s=1
βsγsirt +
C∑
c=1
βcωcirt + τt + irt
(3)
where RL or Risky Client is a dummy variable equal to one for a client whom the
sex worker reports as being at high risk of HIV/AIDS; and of course RL × NC is the
interaction between the two; DC or Clients’ Disutility for Condoms is a dummy variable
equal to one for a client whom the sex worker reports as having more unprotected sex
than the average client. DC × NC is the interaction between Clients’ Disutility for
Condoms and No Condom.
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4.2 Results
Before presenting results, I will discuss why the identifying assumptions hold.
To test the identifying assumption that probability of pregnancy is correlated with
unprotected sex, I test whether it is a weak instrument for unprotected sex. The null
hypothesis is that the two measures of probability of pregnancy are weak instruments for
unprotected sex. For the first measure, I reject the null hypothesis at the one percent level
of significance. The R-Squared (0.649) is fairly high, and the F-Statistic (18.771) is also
above the conventional level of 10. Similarly testing whether the second probability of
pregnancy measure is a weak instrument for unprotected sex, I reject the null hypothesis
of it being a weak instrument at the one percent level of significance. The R-Squared
(0.829) is fairly high, and the F-Statistic (12.092) is also above the conventional level of
10.
To test the second identifying assumption that the probability of pregnancy is uncor-
related with anything in the error term irt first note that, contingent on not using any
birth control, sex workers cannot control their menstrual cycle. The biggest threat to
this second identifying assumption, however, is whether anyone— clients in particular—
can discern when a woman is in her fertile period. In an innovative study, Miller et al.
(2007) show that lap dancers who are not on any contraceptive earn more during their
menstrual cycles. This difference peaks during the fertile period of the cycle when her
probability of pregnancy is highest.
The mechanism they propose for their results is that during fertile periods, the
lap dancers somehow signal or leak cues of their fertility status, and male clients are
influenced to spend more.27 If clients find sex workers more attractive during peak
fertile periods and sex workers can somehow signal this (or clients can somehow observe
this), then attractiveness would be correlated with probability of pregnancy and in turn
predict prices, violating the exclusion restriction so that cov(g, irt) 6= 0. To test whether
27For an interesting discussion on this see pages 379-380 from Miller et al. (2007).
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sex workers can effectively signal their peak fertile periods and/or clients can effectively
discern this period, I regress a dummy variable that indicates whether a sex worker is
on her fertile period on client characteristics and find no relevant28 characteristic that
significantly correlates with a sex worker’s fertile period. Thus, finding it difficult to
reject that the exclusion restriction does not hold.
Figure 2: First Stage Regression with Second Measure of Pregnancy.
Reduced-form regression results are represented graphically in Figure 4.2. The pre-
dicted probability of having unprotected sex decreases as the probability of pregnancy
increases, as predicted by the model. The figure presents the first stage using the second
28The dummy variable that indicates whether a client is from the Kamba tribe does statistically
correlate with a sex worker’s fertile period. Specifically, Kamba clients are less likely to have sex with a
sex worker when she is on her fertile period. Since Miller et al. (2007) show male preference for women
during fertile periods by their increased willingness to pay more, this negative relationship between
Kamba clients and sex workers’ fertile periods should actually push prices down and so this paper’s
identified estimates of the compensating differential for pregnancy risk is a lower bound for Kamba
clients. Results of this exercise are not show, but available upon request.
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measure of probability of pregnancy. A similar figure, however, for the first measure of
probability of pregnancy exhibits a similar negative relationship between the probability
of pregnancy and the predicted probability of having unprotected sex.
Reduced-form regression results of the first stage estimations are reported in columns
(1-2) of table 7.4. Coefficients on both measures of probability of pregnancy are statis-
tically significant at the one percent level of significance, and both are of the expected
sign. For each percent increase in the probability of pregnancy, sex workers are between
35 percent and 125 percent less likely to have unprotected sex.
Table 7.4 here.
Main results are presented in Table 7.5. Columns (1), (3), and (5) present the second
stage specification for the first probability of pregnancy measure while columns (2), (4),
and (6) present results for the second measure. Columns (1-2) present a parsimonious
version of equation (2) that includes no controls, while columns (3-4) include only time
dummies and sex worker controls and finally, columns (5-6) include all controls—time
dummies, sex worker and client controls. Sex workers who have unprotected sex, after
instrumenting with the probability of pregnancy, earn anywhere between Ksh 612 (USD
8.7) and Ksh 840 (USD 12) which is about 1.1 to 1.5 times average price.
Table 7.5 here.
The coefficient β6 that identifies the price premium for unprotected sex due to a
compensating differential for pregnancy risk has all the interactions NC × NB × PP ,
and it varies from Ksh 1,787 (USD 25.5), which is statistically significant at the ten
percent level, to Ksh 7,588 (USD 108.4), which is statistically significant at the five
percent level. These point estimates imply that sex workers who are not on birth control
and who face increasing probabilities of pregnancy get compensated between 3.3 to 13.9
times average price to have unprotected sex. Adding controls does not change statistical
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significance except for the second probability of pregnancy measure, which becomes
insignificant when time dummies and sex worker controls are added in column (4). The
compensating differential for pregnancy risk ranges from Ksh 1,522 (USD 21.7) in column
(6) to Ksh 8,569 (USD 122) in column (3). These ranges constitute being compensated
2.5 to 15.8 times the average price.
Results from including a test for a compensating differential for STI risk and clients’
disutility for condoms are presented in Table 7.6. Columns (1), (3), and (5) present the
second stage specification for the first probability of pregnancy measure while columns
(2), (4), and (6) present results for the second measure. Columns (1-2) present a parsimo-
nious version of equation (3) that include no controls, while columns (3-4) include only
time dummies and sex worker controls and finally, columns (5-6) include all controls—
time dummies, sex worker and client controls.
Table 7.6 here.
None of the competing sources of the price premium for unprotected sex are statis-
tically significant at conventional levels in all columns except (5-6). In column (5), the
coefficient on the pregnancy risk premium is Ksh 5,731 (USD 82) or 9.5 times average
price and statistically significant at 10 percent. The coefficient on the STI risk premium
in the same specification is Ksh 76 (USD 1.1) or 13 percent of average price but not sta-
tistically significant at 10 percent. In column (6), the coefficients on the pregnancy and
STI risks are both statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The STI risk premium
is Ksh 230 (USD 3.3) or 38 percent of average price, while the pregnancy risk premium
is Ksh 1,595, or almost 3 times the average price and about 7 times the premium for
STI risk.
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5 Heterogeneity, Robustness and Limitations
5.1 Heterogeneity
Before I present robustness results and limitations of the empirical estimation of
the theoretical model, I present below two heterogeneity analyses. I estimate the main
specification from equation (2) again with all controls, then estimate this specification
for sex workers who are below the average age of 28.43 years old and also for sex workers
who have more than the average number of own biological children of 2.06. Table 7.9
presents results from that analysis, but I leave out the first stage because it remains the
same as in the full model presented earlier. Columns (1), (3), and (5) present the second
stage specification for the first probability of pregnancy measure while columns (2), (4),
and (6) present results for the second measure. Columns (1-2) present the full version of
equation (2) that include all controls, while columns (3-4) is the full model but for sex
workers who are below the average age of 28.43 years old and finally, columns (5-6) is
the full model but for sex workers who have more than the average 2.06 own biological
children.
Table 7.9 here.
Sex workers who are younger than the average age of the typical sex worker in the
sample are compensated between Ksh 2,511 (USD 35.87) and Ksh 6,002 (USD 85.74),
which is between 1.57 to 1.05 times, respectively, the compensation for the full sam-
ple. Both coefficients are statistically significant at 10 percent. This result is intuitive
because younger sex workers should be more likely to be fertile and thus need to be
more compensated for pregnancy risk if they are to have unprotected sex.29 There is no
heterogeneity among women who have above the average 2.06 own biological children
29Declining reproductivity of women as they age is widely documented. A great summary of this
can be found in Dunson et al. (2002) where they document that women’s fertility begins to decline in
the late 20s with substantial decreases by the late 30s. Please note they also find that men’s fertility is
largely unaffected by age, but with substantial declines by late 30s.
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relative to the full sample.
5.2 Robustness
Because sex workers who are not on birth control can be different in ways that could
affect fertility and therefore affect their ability to charge more for unprotected sex, the
main IV estimation would be estimating a spurious relationship between pregnancy risk
and price. Sex workers on birth control, for instance, could be younger and more attrac-
tive. Recall that in the main results I control for sex worker characteristics including
age, for instance. I do not have a variable that captures attractiveness, but in a regres-
sion of age, experience, education, literacy, ethnicity, marital status and parity on birth
control status, I find only education is a statistically significant predictor of birth control
status.30 Specifically, less educated sex workers are less likely to have birth control. If
we think a lack of education also reduces a sex worker’s bargaining power in negotiating
for higher prices for unprotected sex then this paper’s results constitute a lower bound
of the estimated effect of pregnancy risk on the price premium for unprotected sex.
There could still be sex worker characteristics, however, that are unobserved, and
hence omitted, that affect prices in ways that can be correlated with birth control status.
Estimating a specification that includes a sex worker fixed effect αi will solve this problem
by accounting for differences across sex workers in attractiveness (bargaining power) and
risk preferences. Below, I run a sex worker and time fixed effects model31 to account for
this:
30Results not shown, but available upon request.
31This fixed effects specification is consistent with the literature. Robinson and Yeh (2011) includes
a sex worker fixed effect as well as time dummies, while Arunachalam and Shah (2013) include just a
sex worker fixed effect.
26
Pirt =β0 + β1NC + β2PP + β3(PP ×NB) + β4(NC ×NB) + β5(NC × PP )+
β6(NC × PP ×NB) +
S∑
s=1
βsγsirt +
C∑
c=1
βcωcirt + αi + τt + irt
(4)
This is a similar regression as the main regression with two exceptions. First, this
specification does not exclude the probability of pregnancy. Secondly, because it is a sex
worker fixed effects model it drops the NB or No Birth Control term. Results of this
specification are presented in Table 7.7. Once again columns (1), (3), and (5) present
the sex worker fixed effects specification using the first probability of pregnancy measure
while columns (2), (4), and (6) present results for the second measure. Columns (1-2)
present a parsimonious version of equation (4) that includes no controls, while columns
(3-4) includes only time dummies and sex worker controls and finally, columns (5-6)
include all controls—time dummies, sex worker and client controls.
Table 7.7 here.
Results show that the coefficient estimates that correspond to β6 in the above speci-
fication are not statistically significant. The coefficient estimates of β6 ranges from Ksh
107.7 (USD 1.5) in column (2) to Ksh 512 (USD 7.3) in column (5) and is negative in
column (1).
It is, however, important to recall that there are no observable statistical differences
among women who have birth control and those who do not, except in their levels of
education. Even with that difference, it can be argued the effect would have negated
a positive price differential between women with birth control and those without it,
indicating that, in fact, pregnancy risk’s effect on the price for unprotected sex is a
lower bound estimate. Additionally, because sex workers are not using and disusing
birth control throughout each menstrual cycle, birth control is dropped in the fixed
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effects model, excluding an important parameter. Further, the fixed effects models, at
best, explain about 3.5 percent of the variation in the price for sex. The main 2SLS
models, however, explain as much as 18 percent or six times that of the fixed effects
models. Further, the fixed effects specification is not supported by the theoretical model
that argues for the probability of pregnancy being an instrument for unprotected sex.
Figure 3: Conditional Predicted Price by Birth Control Across Menstrual Cycle.
Further, I run a linear regression model regressing price on pregnancy risk, control-
ling for unprotected sex, risky clients, STI risk, and all other sex worker, client, and
time controls, clustering standard errors at the sex worker level. I then predict prices
conditional on all of these observables, plotting these predicted prices along the proba-
bility of pregnancy dimension for sex workers with birth control and those without birth
control. Figure 5.2 presents results from that exercise.32 As the figure shows, prices
32This figure includes only for the first measure of probability of pregnancy. A figure using the second
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paid for vaginal sex are higher for sex workers without birth control and this gap widens
around the fertile period of a woman’s menstrual cycle (days 8 to 19). Importantly,
during the first four days of the menstrual cycle, when the sex worker is on her menses,
prices converge slightly so that there are no differences in prices received by sex workers
with or without birth control. Further, nowhere in the cycle do the prices received by
sex workers with birth control intersect with prices received by sex workers without birth
control.
I also run a placebo test with the main specification controlling for STI risk and
clients’ disutility but only on sex workers with birth control. The first stage remains the
same but the second stage is as follows:
Pirt =β0 + β1N̂C + β2(NC × PP ) + β3RL+ β4(RL×NC) + β5DC + β6(DC ×NC)+
S∑
s=1
βsγsirt +
C∑
c=1
βcωcirt + τt + irt
(5)
for NB = 0.
If there exists a compensating differential for pregnancy risk, then the coefficient β2
on this main pregnancy risk variable will not have any predictive power on price because
we should not expect sex workers who are on birth control to worry about pregnancy risk.
Table 7.8 presents the results from this estimation. The coefficient β2 is the one with the
interaction between NC and PP and constitutes the pregnancy risk premium. Table 7.8
presents results of the placebo test for both probabilities of pregnancy measures (Column
1-2). Both coefficients are negative and not statistically significant at 10 percent.
Table 7.8 here.
measure of probability of pregnancy offers a similar picture.
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5.3 Limitations
The risky client variable is subjective and, given measurement error, this variable
could be suffering attenuation bias.33 To try to solve for this I also run an instrumental
variable estimation that uses the uncircumcised status of clients as an instrument for
STI risk. This estimation allows for testing for endogeneity of the STI risk variable,
thus providing greater confidence that the relationship between STI risk and the price
premium for unprotected sex is identified. I exploit the fact that a sexual transaction
with an uncircumcised men is external to the sex worker’s choice.34 I also exploit the
fact that uncircumcised men are more likely to get infected with HIV/AIDS, among
other STIs,35 in order to remove any endogenous variation in the risky client variable
by using uncircumcised clients as an instrument for risky clients. Results of this 2SLS
specification rejects a compensating differential for STI risk as the source of the price
premium for unprotected sex.36
The uncircumcised status of clients, however, is a weak instrument for risky clients
and, more over, there is evidence to suggest that the exclusion restriction does not hold
because who is and is not circumcised might be related to ethnicity and other factors
that could be related to prices paid. When I run a simple linear regression expressing
client characteristics as predictors of circumcision, I find that indeed being a Luo, Teso,
and having handsome looks positively predict circumcision status. Although when I run
these predictors in a linear regression with price, almost all become negative and not
33Recent work by Delavande and Kohler (2012) show that perceptions of not only one’s HIV status
but also one’s spousal HIV status is important in driving one’s sexual behavior and perceptions may
defer with actual probabilities, with differential effects on behavior. In the case of commercial sex, the
effects of perceptions are even more salient given the transient nature of certain clients, providing little
information for sex workers to base their perceptions of client risk.
34Sex workers can decline a sexual transaction with an uncircumcised client, or avoid clients they
know to be uncircumcised from previous sexual encounters but for an overwhelming majority of sex
workers, the choice of having sex with an uncircumcised client is largely outside their control.
35Many studies show that uncircumcised men are relatively more likely to get infected with HIV/AIDS,
genital herpes, syphilis, chancroid and other STIs. For further reading on this see for instance Bailey
et al. (2007); Gray et al. (2007); Weiss et al. (2006); Auvert et al. (2005); Weiss et al. (2000); and
Bongaarts et al. (1989).
36Results not shown but available upon request.
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statistically significant at 10 percent.37 So although I find that some client characteristics
are linked to circumcision status, these characteristics do not predict price.
I run a similar specification, with the uncircumcised status of clients as an instrument
for clients’ disutility for condoms in order to account for the fact that the clients’ disutility
for condoms measure may be biased given that it is subjective to sex workers’ perceptions
of clients. I exploit evidence that suggests that circumcision can be associated with
decreased penile functioning, penile sensitivity and sexual pleasure (Kim and Pang 2007;
Fink et al. 2002). Results of this 2SLS specification rejects clients’ disutility for condoms
as the source of the price premium for unprotected sex.38 Once again, the uncircumcised
status of clients is a weak instrument for clients’ disutility for condoms.
The empirical estimates in this paper may suffer from the endogeneity matching
problem akin to that described by Ackerberg and Botticini (2002). The sex market’s
invisible hand does not randomly match clients to sex workers. Rather, they may match
on some unobservables such as their bargaining power, which may introduce bias in the
empirical estimates. The panel nature of the data helps account for this if you believe
sex worker observables are time-invariant.39 Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) suggest, as
a first step, looking at pairwise correlations between the principal and agent, in this
case, the sex worker and her clients. I do this by regressing client observables on all sex
worker observables.40 I find that being a risky client is positively related to sex workers’
tribe, widow status, divorce status, and sex work experience. Handsome clients are also
more likely to have sex with younger sex workers, who have relatively more sex work
experience, but are less likely to be able to read in Kiswahili. Client ethnicity, however,
is not related to sex worker ethnicity so there seems to be no suggestive evidence of
matching on tribal affiliation. In any case, in as much as there is endogenous matching
between sex workers and clients on some observables, estimates may be biased and in
37Results not shown but available upon request.
38Results not shown but available upon request.
39I would like to thank Marc Bellemare for providing this point.
40Results not shown, but available upon request
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ways that may or may not overestimate the compensating differential for pregnancy risk
as the source of the price premium for unprotected sex.
A final issue in support of a compensating differential for STI risk as the source
of the price premium for unprotected sex is the positive and statistically significant
findings on the anal sex premium from Arunachalam and Shah (2013), Robinson and Yeh
(2011), among others. The inference from this empirical result is that the fact that STI
transmission, most importantly, HIV transmission, is more likely during unprotected anal
sex supports a compensating differential for STI risk as the source of the price premium
for unprotected sex. Anal sex with a condom, however, also exhibits a strongly positive
and statistically significant effect on prices.41 Moreover, Sˇtulhofer and Ajdukovic´ (2011)
finds that anal sex is usually associated with anodyspareunia42 and that almost half
of women surveyed who have had 2 or more anal sexual intercourse in the past year,
discontinued anal sex due to pain and discomfort while Stadler et al. (2007) documents
that anal sex in South Africa— a context relatively similar to western Kenya where
the data used in this paper was collected— is often associated with sexual coercion by
men, though also sexual pleasure. Consequently, it is not evident, prima facie, that
an anal sex price premium exists because of being compensated for STI risk or sexual
discomfort and/or a reflection of anodyspareunia, with more anodyspareunic sex workers
being relatively more compensated for anal sex.
6 Conclusion
Using a rich dataset from Robinson and Yeh (2011) containing information on risky
clients, clients’ preferences for condom use, and pregnancy relevant variables, I identify
and estimate the source of the price premium for unprotected sex. I find that a compen-
sating differential for pregnancy risk is a source of the price premium for unprotected
41Results not shown, but available upon request.
42Pain during receptive anal intercourse.
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sex. Sex workers are risk averse to pregnancy because of the non-trivial costs of taking
care of children. I find that clients’ disutility for condoms, the other competing theory,
is not a source of the price premium for unprotected sex, while I find that another source
of the price premium for unprotected sex is a compensating differential for STI risk.
Identifying and estimating the source of the price premium is important because
the ultimate goal of public policy should be to reduce incentives of sex workers to sup-
ply unprotected sex and of clients to demand it. Because sex workers contribute to
the transmission of HIV/AIDS, and it requires billions of dollars to take care of vul-
nerable children such as HIV/AIDS orphans (Stover et al. 2007), understanding sex
workers’ fertility preferences and reducing their incentives to have unprotected sex will
save resource-constrained governments in the developing world money that can be bet-
ter targeted to intervene with sex workers and clients. Knowledge about the source of
the price premium for unprotected sex is informative and prescriptive when determining
how public health interventions should be targeted. If a compensating differential for
pregnancy risk is the source of the price premium for unprotected sex, as this paper
argues, then greater birth control coverage should reduce pregnancy risk and thus the
price premium for unprotected sex, and because this will reduce incentives to have un-
protected sex, we should expect less STI and HIV/AIDS transmission, as a result of
less unprotected sex. This paper’s findings add to the positive effects of birth control in
controlling the transmission of HIV/AIDS. Jayachandran (2014) also provides evidence
for additional benefits of birth control in prolonging breast-feeding among infants older
than one year43, while other developmental benefits of contraceptives are documented
by Miller (2010).
43Jayachandran (2014), however, also finds suggestive evidence of a substitution effect of birth control
where mothers breastfeed less, infants three years and older, when using birth control.
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7 Tables
7.1 Sex Worker Information
Summary Statistics
Age 28.43
(6.98)
Start Age 18.67
(5.14)
Experience 9.84
(6.07)
Years of Education 9.20
(2.69)
Number of Biological Children 2.06
(1.83)
Marital Status
Never Married 0.44
(0.50)
Widowed 0.23
(0.42)
Divorced 0.20
(0.40)
Cohabitating 0.13
(0.33)
Can Read Kiswahili 0.95
(0.21)
Can Write Kiswahili 0.88
(0.33)
Tribe
Luo 0.51
(0.50)
Luhya 0.39
(0.49)
HIV Knowledge Test Score (0-1 Scale) 0.94
(0.06)
Vaginal Sex 0.94
(0.10)
Income from Sex Work per Day (Ksh) 850.71
(460.99)
Hours in Sex Work per Day 7.35
(2.40)
Income from Other Work per Day (Ksh) 106.08
(120.14)
Hours in Other Work per Day 7.73
(39.33)
Hourly Wage from Sex Work (Ksh) 151.77
(92.24)
Hourly Wage from Other Work (Ksh) 41.07
(38.54)
Observations 192
Note: Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses.
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7.2 Client Information
Summary Statistics
Disutility for Condoms 0.45
(0.45)
Disutility for Condoms for Unrisky Clients 0.21
(0.38)
Risky Clients 0.46
(0.46)
Uncircumcised Clients 0.25
(0.40)
Poor Clients 0.09
(0.26)
Clean Clients 0.62
(0.44)
Handsome Clients 0.54
(0.46)
Tribe
Luhya 0.25
(0.40)
Luo 0.24
(0.39)
Kikuyu 0.14
(0.32)
Teso 0.09
(0.26)
Kalenjin 0.06
(0.22)
Somali 0.06
(0.23)
Akamba 0.05
(0.21)
Ugandan 0.04
(0.17)
Occupation
Government 0.27
(0.41)
Truck Driver 0.19
(0.36)
Business 0.19
(0.36)
Hotel 0.10
(0.27)
Shop 0.09
(0.26)
Boda Boda (Bike Taxi) Driver 0.08
(0.25)
Bar 0.05
(0.20)
Other 0.03
(0.16)
Observations 3,656
Note: Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses.
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7.3 Sexual Transactions
Summary Statistics
Price for Sexual Transaction (Ksh) 509.51
(286.41)
Unprotected Vaginal Sex 0.08
(0.14)
STI 0.03
(0.07)
STI Risk 0.03
(0.10)
Birth Control 0.60
(0.49)
Observations 192
Note: Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses.
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7.4 Probability of Pregnancy as an Instrument for Unprotected Sex
Probability of Pregnancy as an Instrument for Unprotected Sex
(1) (2)
No Condom No Condom
Probability of Pregnancy 1 -1.251***
(0.283)
Probability of Pregnancy 2 -0.353***
(0.101)
Constant 0.170* 0.098
0.096 0.075
CSW Controls Yes Yes
Client Controls Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes
Sexual Transactions 1827 1744
R-Squared 0.720 0.829
F Statistic 1827 2651
Notes:
a. Standard errors clustered at the sex worker level in parentheses.
b. *** 1% level of confidence.
c. ** 5% level of confidence.
d. * 10% level of confidence.
e. CSW Controls include sex workers’ age, experience, education, literacy, tribe, marital status,
and number of own children.
f. Client Controls include whether clients are regular, risky, wealthy, clean, handsome, tribe, occupation,
and disutility for condoms.
g. Time Controls are just day and month dummies.
h. Other controls not shown include unprotected anal sex, anal sex, and vaginal sex.
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7.8 Placebo Test: Pregnancy Risk with Sex Workers Who Are On
Birth Control
Placebo Test: Pregnancy Risk with Sex Workers Who Are On Birth Control
(1) (2)
Ksh Ksh
No Condom 437.0 286.7
(338.6) (301.5)
Risky Client -98.27 -141.8**
(67.50) (64.49)
Disutility for Condoms 38.99 13.42
(61.62) (59.41)
Risky Client×No Condom 109.7 322.2
(242.8) (210.0)
Disutility for Condoms×No Condom -291.5** -168.6
(144.9) (128.2)
No Condom×Probability of Pregnancy -3945.3 -1172.9
(2931.1) (861.1)
CSW Controls Yes Yes
Client Controls Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes
Constant -176.7 278.9
(235.8) (200.7)
Kshe 559.012 560.481
Sexual Transactions 1210 1155
R-Squared 0.0523 0.102
Chi-Squared 980.3 1403.7
Notes:
a. Standard errors clustered at the sex worker level in parentheses.
b. *** 1% level of confidence.
c. ** 5% level of confidence.
d. * 10% level of confidence.
e. Mean of Ksh for each regression.
f. CSW Controls include sex workers’ age, experience, education, literacy, tribe, marital status,
and number of own children.
g. Client Controls include whether clients are regular, risky, wealthy, clean, handsome, tribe,
occupation, and disutility for condoms.
h. Time Controls are just day and month dummies.
i. Other controls not shown include unprotected anal sex, anal sex, and vaginal sex.
j. Column 1 is for the first measure of probability of pregnancy, while column 2 is for the
second measure of probability of pregnancy.
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C Proofs
C.1 Proposition 1
Proof. Recall that the first order conditions give us the following equality: U
′(P1Q∗−CQ∗)
U ′(−P2Q∗) =
P2
P1−C [
1−g
g ]. Now, because we are mainly concerned with what happens to P1 and how
sex workers chose Q∗ let 1U ′(−P2Q∗) and
P2
P1−C be equal as some constant k so that
kU ′(P1Q∗−CQ∗) = k 1−gg and eliminating the constant k the F.O.C. equality reduces to
U ′(P1Q∗−CQ∗) = 1−gg . Notice that with this assumption implies P1 = P2U ′(−P2Q)+C
which would mean that the price for unprotected sex consists of the price for protected
sex times the marginal disutility of receiving P2 when Q > 0 plus the costs of unpro-
tected sex. Notice also that P1 < P2U
′(−P2Q) +C cannot occur if a price premium for
unprotected sex exists so that the only other option is P1 > P2U
′(−P2Q) + C. But for
our purposes, I assume that P1 = P2U
′(−P2Q) + C.
Case 1: g → 0
Notice that as g → 0 then 1−gg → ∞. Thus, to maintain the equality, this implies
that U ′(P1Q∗ − CQ∗)→∞. Since U ′(P1Q∗ − CQ∗)→∞ and we know that ∂U∂Q > 0 it
must be that Q∗ →∞.
At equilibrium, if sex workers are willing to provide unprotected sex to maximize
their utility and they know that g → 0, for trivially low levels of g sex workers will sell
unprotected sex for relatively lower prices, putting downward pressures on P1 so that
P1 → 0. This result then implies that ∂P1∂g > 0 but only through ∂Q∂g < 0.
Case 2: g → 1
Notice that as g → 1 then 1−gg → 0. Thus, to maintain the equality, this implies that
U ′(P1Q∗−CQ∗)→ 0. Since U ′(P1Q∗−CQ∗)→ 0 and we know that ∂U∂Q > 0 it must be
that Q∗ → 0.
At equilibrium, if sex workers are willing to provide unprotected sex to maximize
their utility but they know that g → ∞, for non-trivially high levels of g sex workers
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will sell unprotected sex if and only if prices are relatively higher as compensation for
the increased risk of pregnancy, putting upward pressures on P1 so that P1 →∞. This
result then implies that ∂P1∂g > 0 but only through
∂Q
∂g < 0.
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